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1THE CONTRIBUTION OF INTUITIVE THINKING 
TO THE GROW TH IN TEACHING ABILITIES
B.J. Wolters
University o f Nymegen 
The Netherlands
Abstract
It is commonly accepted that the use o f teaching abilities in pre-active teaching contributes 
to the growth in the cognitive structure o f teaching abilities, which in turns increases the 
availability o f teaching abilities in future pre-active as well as in interactive teaching. 
However, in interactive teaching the teacher is often confronted with startling unexpected 
teaching learning situations, which did not occur previously in the same way. The teacher 
must respond immediately, without conscious deliberation, and yet the use o f teaching 
routines is inappropriate. The analytic mode o f thought, which is common in pre-active 
teaching, is no longer adequate here. Intuitive thinking is appropriate because unprejudiced 
and empathetic perception o f the situation makes it possible to form an image in which the 
cognitive structure o f teaching abilities is present in the mode o f simultaneous, non-verbal, 
and subconscious significances. The behavioral response o f the teacher reflects the richness of 
significances in the image. However, intuitive thinking only contributes to the growth in the 
cognitive structure o f teaching abilities if  verification o f the behavioral reaction in terms of 
logical, verbalized justification takes place.
Introduction
Teacher trainers notice that much of what is going on in the classroom has not been 
perceived by the teachers-in-training. However, improvement takes place rather quickly, 
because the teacher trainers pay attention to various teaching skills that can be practiced 
during the lessons. Thus more structure gradually arises in the perception o f lessons which 
teachers-in-training observe. As a consequence, they learn to discriminate more and more 
between teaching learning situations. Now the conclusion seems to be evident: (in-service) 
training has a positive effect on teaching effectiveness. However, the effects o f training often 
fall short o f expectations. Obviously, teachers are not fully able to use the teaching abilities 
they learned in daily teaching. Moreover, some teachers are better able to take advantage of 
the teaching abilities they have learned than others. Why is it that some teachers can take
2better advantage o f the teaching abilities they learned than others? In other words, what 
makes the one teacher possess greater competence in teaching abilities than another?
This is a self-evident question. Answers did not fail to come. In this article I will try to 
contribute to answering this question by taking a viewpoint that is different from the 
traditional rational kind o f teacher thinking, which is called 'analytic' below. This different 
kind o f teacher thinking concerns intuitive teacher thinking.
Question
what is the contribution o f intuitive teacher thinking to the growth in teaching abilities?
The growth in teaching abilities is a cooperative action o f both analytic thinking and 
intuitive thinking. Both types o f thinking are dependent on each other. Moreover, at present 
analytic thinking is dominant in explaining the growth in teaching abilities. It has to be 
proved that intuitive thinking is supplementary to analytic thinking in explaining the growth 
in teaching abilities. Because o f that, attention will first be paid to analytic teacher thinking.
The Cognitive Structure o f Teaching Abilities
Experienced teachers who are well equipped to handle problems and who are successful 
and respected by their pupils have a well developed cognitive structure o f teaching abilities 
(Sprinthall & Thies-Sprinthall,1983; Veenman,1985). As a consequence, they respond 
adequately in varied teaching learning situations. This assertion can be made clear by 
referring to the literature concerning cognitive complexity.
Cognitive complexity
In theories o f cognitive complexity (Streufert,1978,171-178), the concept o f differentiation 
plays a central role (Streufert, 1978, p. 88). In the elaborated theory o f Schroder, Driver & 
Streufert (1967), the concept o f integration also plays part in the theory. W hat does 
differentiation mean? The more viewpoints somebody takes in for the description or 
interpretation o f a phenomenon, the more differentiated the behavior. For example, when one 
describes a country, one can focus on the form of government: authoritarian or democratic; on 
the economic system: capitalist or socialist; on the military power; etc.
Integration means that differentiated dimensions or characteristics are being synthesized.
So differentiation is a condition for integration. For example, a female manager judges an 
employer as motivated and intelligent, that is to say, she differentiates. She summarizes these
3two characteristics as competence, that is to say, she integrates. Another manager judges the 
same employer as motivated, intelligent and non-empathetic. This manager can summarize 
these judgm ents as competent and non-empathetic, but also as strong need for personal 
power. This last description represents a higher level o f integration than the former one 
(Schroder, 1978, p. 45).
This example demonstrates that people differ not only in the number o f characteristics or 
dimensions they use in their descriptions, but also in the degree o f integration. Schroder, 
Driver & Streufert (1967) make a distinction between four levels o f integration. Each next 
level has more relations between dimensions or characteristics, which are also more 
hierarchically organized, than the previous level. So a more and more complicated network 
arises.
This network does concern presumably also teaching behavior. Cognitive representations 
of teaching abilities and their relations then also form a network. The cognitive structure of 
teaching ablities can be more or less differentiated and hierarchically integrated. Teachers 
who behave on a low level o f integration show simple behavior; teachers who behave on a 
high level show complex behavior (Schroder, Driver & Streufert, op. cit.): a differentiated 
and hierarchically integrated network of relations between the cognitive representations of 
teaching abilities.
It is assumed that this complicated network does not lead only to complex behavior, but 
also to a greater availability o f teaching abilities. The more differentiated and integrated the 
network o f cognitive representations o f teaching abilities, the greater the chance that in an 
actual teaching learning situation, a proper behavior, that is to say, teaching ability, can be 
"traced" along one o f the many paths in the network (Andriessen & Boonman, 1988; 
Lodewijks, 1981; Mayer, 1980; Pea, 1987; Prawat, 1989; Schroder, Driver & Streufert, 1967; 
Simons, 1990).
Analytic teacher thinking is especially important in preactive teaching. If  intuitive thinking 
plays a role in the growth o f teaching abilities, it will be in interactive teaching. The role of 
both types o f thinking will become clearer by presenting the distinction between preactive 
and interactive teaching within the frame o f teacher thinking tradition.
Preactive and interactive teaching
In the 'classic' article o f Shavelson & Stern (1981), a distinction was made between 
preactive teaching en interactive teaching. Preactive teaching refers to planning the lesson: the 
subject-matter, materials, teaching learning activities for achieving the desired objectives, and 
so forth. I f  one often practices preactive teaching, a complex cognitive structure o f teaching
4abilities gradually arises which leads to an increasingly smooth teaching learning behavior in 
interactive teaching. At the beginning o f this research tradition, "rationality" was stressed - in 
conceptions o f the teacher as a decision-maker, problem-solver, information processor, or 
planner (Lowyck, 1984, p. 9). Later on it was recognized that routines are formed, like 
subroutines in a computer, which discharge the information-processing system (Peters, 1984).
Although preactive teaching determines interactive teaching to a large extent (Lowyck, op. 
cit.; Shavelson & Stern, op. cit.), preactive teaching is not a blueprint for interactive teaching. 
Interactive teaching has its own character. Interactive teaching makes a characteristic 
contribution to the teaching learning behavior as a whole and in turn influences preactive 
teaching.
During preactive teaching the teacher has a lot o f time to think about the teaching behavior 
he or she wants to realize in interactive teaching. But if  the teacher is confronted with an 
unexpected situation during the lesson, which startles the teacher and for which an immediate 
reaction is not available, it is impossible to deliberate what to do. Time is lacking for 
conscious argumentation about adequate behavior. Yet behavior is necessary. But how can 
teachers react adequately in a teaching learning situation they did not preview during 
preactive teaching? M any expert teachers behave adequately in such situations.
Thesis: they do so because o f intuitive thinking, which is a mode o f thinking that is 
qualitatively different from the analytic thinking in preactive teaching (Clark & Peterson, 
1986, p. 258).
In the next paragraph the tenability o f this thesis will be investigated by formulating a 
theory about intuition, and by trying to falsify this theory.
Intuitive teacher thinking
Before this theory is developed, a tentative description o f the intuitive thinking proces in a 
typical divergent production task will be given. In the bricks item of the ideational fluency 
test Unusual Uses "give as many uses o f a brick as you can", ten-year-old children give two 
essentially different responses (Guilford, 1967; Noddings & Shore, 1984). Some children 
confine themselves to traditional uses, such as building a house, a tower, and so on. They 
reproduce what they already knew about bricks, but they do not really perceive the brick.
Other children also mention these traditional uses but original ones too, such as a grave 
stone for a bird, a pillow for a robot, and so on. These children do not simply remember their 
knowledge about the use o f bricks without seeing the brick, but they really perceive the brick 
in its experienced sense qualities: coarse, red, square, that is to say, authentically, 
unmediated, with an open mind. So far the example.
5Now a more formal description o f a theory o f intuitive thinking will be presented. The 
authentic perception o f the brick can be characterized as physiognomic perception (Bastick, 
1982). This physiognomic perception also plays a role when one characterizes a line-drawing 
as 'prickly'. Besides visual sensations, kinaesthetic sensations play a prominent role in 
physiognomic perception.
In physiognomic perception o f the brick, one makes use o f the connotations o f the brick, 
and not only of the established denotative meaning(s). The denotative and the connotative 
meanings are not formulated, but are present in a non-verbal, subconscious, significant 
simultaneity. This abstract formulation can be illustrated by the old phrase: "a picture is 
worth a thousand words" (Bastick, 1982, p. 2). But it can also be illustrated and made clear 
by formulations such as: perception and thinking will be influenced by a background which 
can be referred to as an indefinite boundlessness which is unarticulated and not formalized 
(Hodgson, 1991, p. 107; Merleau-Ponty, 1945), but just makes formulations possible (Reed, 
1991, p. 179). The boundlessness o f this background becomes apparent from the changes 
occurring in the meanings o f words in idioms, and in the origin o f new words, expressions 
and reactions. This boundless background is a mysterious, irreducible origin o f significants, 
"le corps" (Merleau-Ponty, 1945), which lies at the root o f perception and thinking . In every 
expression all other significances are present in a perspective, a horizon, and ultimately 
rooted in "le corps". "Le corps" remains present, even in our brightest reflexive acts 
(Merleau-Ponty, op. cit.).
Basically this physiognomic perception is held responsible for the original reactions to the 
above-mentioned bricks item. Physiognomic perception can be understood as the forming of 
a physiognomy or an im age. This image is not like a picture, but is a technical term indicating 
to the non-verbal , significant, subconcious simultaneity. The pupil who gives original 
reactions is said to have a rich imagination.
Summarizing and concluding, the subconscious, non-verbal, significant simultaneity in the 
image refers to implicit knowledge, that is to say to significances which are present as 
subconscious connotations o f elements in the situation. This means that the cognitive 
representations o f teaching abilities are present in a mode which is different from the familiar 
conscious, verbal, unequivocal, sequential-logic mode.
However, physiognomic perception is only possible if  the situation has been perceived 
empathetically. (Bastick,1982). In other words, the perception o f connotations is only 
possible if  the situation or the object, for example a brick, has been perceived empathically. 
This means that teachers only form an image o f the situation if  they are a part o f it, involved 
in it, participate in it; if  there is an unprejudiced partnership between the teacher and the 
situation; if  the usual subject-object discrimination is temporarily, partly reduced, in a
6controlled way; if  the bond between the object and its significances is loosened (Bastick, 
1982).
An example derived from a frequent interactive teaching learning situation will illustrate 
this empathy factor. I f  a pupil chats with his neighbor, teachers can react in two ways. They 
can perceive the situation objectively, from the outside and, with blinkers, only aim at 
making the pupil be quiet. They take an obvious measure to make him stop chatting: they 
give the chatting pupil a turn to involve him in the lesson. The teacher who perceives the 
situation empathically, on the other hand, is surprised about the chatting o f just this pupil, 
because he usually never talks and is always very attentive and interested. Moreover, due to 
body posture and (facial) expression, the teacher has the impression that the initiative to chat 
was taken by his neighbor. After all, the pupils are more restless than usual. This teacher does 
not react by giving the chatting pupil a turn, but is able to form an image o f the situation 
through empathy. This makes it possible to form hypotheses about the situation which he 
checks with the pupils: what is the matter? don't you understand my lesson? did you have a 
test last lesson? has something happened during the interval that impressed or troubled you? 
Forming an image by empathically involving oneself in the situation, makes it possible to 
achieve the aim o f getting the pupil to stop chatting, but here one has taken account o f many 
aspects and characteristics of the situation. The teacher does not react to a stimulus 'pupil 
chats with his neighbor' with the response 'give him a turn', but he reacts to a situation. The 
teacher behaves imaginatively. The richer the image is, that is to say, the more connotations 
the image contains, the greater the chance o f an adequate or more adequate reaction. But by 
which process will the image give rise to a reaction?
A shuffling o f the subconscious, non-verbal, simultaneous significances takes place in the 
short time between the confrontation with the startling unexpected teaching learning situation 
and the reaction. This shuffling o f significances does not take place at random, or in an 
associative process (Bastick, 1982; Mednick, 1962 ), but is directed by the intended solution 
to the unexpected interactive teaching learning problem (Selz, 1922). The result o f this 
shuffling process is the behavioral reaction o f the teacher. This process can be designated as a 
process o f intuitive thinking, in contrast to analytic thinking, which can be characterized as a 
process o f logical manipulation with predefined denotations.
Summarizing, the teacher who cannot complete preactive teaching in a startling 
unexpected interactive teaching learning situation, is forced to think intuitively in order to 
behave adequately in such a situation. He or she is involved empathically, unprejudiced, with 
an open mind in this unexpected, startling interactive teaching learning, and will perceive the 
situation physiognomically, that is to say, he or she forms an image o f the situation. In the 
image knowledge functions in a way different from analytic thinking. Cognitive 
representations of preactive teaching abilities are connotatively, as implicit knowledge,
7present in a subconscious, non-verbal mode o f significant simultaneity, in which the bond 
between object or term and defined significance is loosened. A shuffling of these connotative 
significances takes place directed by the intended solution to the interactive problem 
situation. The forthcoming unreflected behavior o f the teacher is not thoughtless; the 
behavior bears the traces o f the knowledge o f teaching abilities in relation to the situation.
But is it unavoidable to explain the behavior o f a teacher in an unexpected, startling 
interactive teaching learning situation by means o f intuitive thinking? Or is it also possible to 
explain this behavior in terms o f analytic thinking? In that case the explanation in terms of 
intuitive thinking is redundant. But this explanations does not seem to be redundant, as will 
be shown in the next paragraphs.
The contribution o f intuitive thinking to the growth in teaching abailities
This contribution will be assessed by focussing on three issues:
- can intuition be reduced to recognition?
- no, because "Gestalt" and divergent thinking problems can not be solved in this way; and
- many unexpected interactive teaching learning situations have characteristics o f both types 
o f problems.
Intuition or recognition?
The unusual reaction of the teacher to the chatting pupil in the previous paragraph 
resembles the solution to problems such as the expert medical diagnosis o f a physician, or the 
almost instanteneous grasp of the important chess relations by examining an unknown board 
position. These can be characterized as "Gestalt" problems. According to the previous 
paragraph, the solutions to these types o f problems require intuitive thinking. But do they 
really? Simon (1987, p. 482, 486) states that rapid responses to "Gestalt" problems are 
essentially synonymous with recognition. The author means that the problem-solving process 
takes place without being able to provide a veridical account o f every problem-solving step. 
In the medical case, the physician's diagnosis o f a patient is primarily a sequential, step-by- 
step, logical, though shortened procedure, that is to say, primarily analytic thinking.
Simon (1987) appears to be right. He notes that processes o f recognition, such as solving 
"Gestalt" problems, have long been successfully modeled by computer programs (p. 489).
For Simon (1987), it is beyond doubt that the validity o f human thinking is determined by the 
possibility o f computer simulation: "The real test o f programs is whether they can simulate 
the actual human behavior that they purport to model" (p. 490).
8I f  the solution o f "Gestalt" problems can be explained by analytic thinking, that is to say, 
by a logical, step-by-step, though shortened, procedure, then a theory o f intuition, as 
described above, is redundant. It would be superfluous to appeal to intuition.
But it is too early to conclude that solutions o f "Gestalt" problems can be found by 
analytic thinking. It is far from certain that computer simulation o f the thinking process 
corresponds to the way human beings actyually think (Coolen, 1990, p. 144; Swart, 1990), 
and that this is the only, or best way. Simulating a solution by a computer seems only to be 
possible in the case o f logical operations on specifically defined concepts. As has been shown 
in the previous paragraph, not all thinking can be reduced to logical operations on 
unequivocally defined concepts, whether shortened or not. Especially "Gestalt" problems 
cannot be solved in this way. This will be indicated in the next paragraph.
Restructuring the problem situation
In this paragraph it will be shown that the reasoning process which leads to the solution of 
the two-string problem of M aier (1931), which is a classic "Gestalt" problem, can not be 
characterized as logical opperations on unequivocal definitions o f concepts, that is to say, as 
an analytic thinking process
In a room two ropes hang from the ceiling. One rope is in the middle o f the room, the 
other one is in a corner. Various objects, such as a scissors, hooks, pincers, and so on lie on a 
desk. It is impossible to tie the ropes together by taking the end o f the rope in the corner and 
walking to the other one in the middle. But this problem can be solved by attaching a weight, 
for example pincers, to the end of the rope in the middle of the room, bringing it in oscillation 
and catching it with one hand when it reaches the rope in the cormer which you hold with 
your other hand.
These pincers have got a new significance. Analytic thinking, and so the computer, is not 
able to give a new significance to an object or situation. The requirement o f giving a new 
significance to the pincers to solve the two-string problem makes it impossible to solve the 
problem by logical reasoning, because logical reasoning presupposes unequivocal definitions 
o f terms to operate with. So Simon's explanation in terms o f recognition does not seem 
plausible in the case o f "Gestalt" problems.
The role o f physiognomic, empathic perception in achieving a new significance can be 
illustrated by the way an original reaction to a divergent production problem is achieved. The 
unusual, original answer "pillow for a robot" o f a ten-years-old child to the bricks item "give 
as many uses o f a brick as you can", requires that terms or objects in the situation get a new 
significance, that is to say, by restructuring the problem situation. This can be exemplified by 
the following scheme:
9brick: rectangular, hard — > pillow: rectangular, soft — > human
— > pillow: rectangular, hard — > robot 
The child "feels" that the soft, rectangular pillow for a human being o f flesh and blood is 
analoguous to the hard, rectangular pillow for a mechanical being like a robot. The 
significance o f "pillow" has been extended.
But are unexpected, interactive teaching learning situations predominantly o f the "Gestalt" 
or divergent thinking type?
Restructuring the teaching learning situation
The two-string problem of M aier is a typical "Gestalt" problem, like the tum or problem of 
Duncker (1935). The brick problem, however, is a typical divergent production problem. As 
has been illustrated in the previous paragraph, both types o f problems require a restructuring 
o f the problem situation to achieve the solution ("Gestalt"), or different adequate, even 
original solutions (divergent production). The situation "chatting pupil" has characeristics of 
both types o f problems. The reaction o f the teacher has to meet the situation for being 
adequate. But this does not exclude the fact that different more and less adequate reactions are 
possible. In both cases the reaction o f the teacher can be interpreted as a restructuring o f the 
problem field in which a new significance is attached to an element o f the situation.
So far the three issues.
Now it has been shown that intuitive thinking plays a part in finding adequate reactions in 
startling, unexpected interactive teaching learning situations. But the question 'what 
contribution can intuitive teacher thinking make to the growth in teaching abilities?' has not 
yet fully been answered. The result o f intuitive thinking evaporates if  the intuitive reaction is 
not verified in terms o f conscious, verbal, sequential reasoning, that is to say, by 
argumentation. In this argumentation the teacher uses the the usual conscious, verbal mode, 
which is an explicit statement o f the relevant subconscious, significant, simultaneous, non­
verbal mode. Only then does intuitive thinking lead to a growth of the cognitive structure of 
teaching abilities. Verification is a form o f reflection, which is an important concept in 
teacher education. The substantial function o f reflecting on the intuitive reaction with regard 




In teacher-education programs, teachers are encouraged to discuss the lesson before and 
after the teaching. In this discussion teaching abilities which will be (before) or were (after) 
practiced, are mentioned and substantiated explicitly. In these argumentations teaching 
abilities are related to each other. Arguing leads to a more differentiated and hierarchically 
integrated cognitive structure o f teaching abilities. Such arguing can be directed at the 
questions: W hat do you think the consequences o f your (planned) behavior are? W hat caused 
this specific interactive teaching learning situation? These questions are o f the utmost 
importance if  the teaching behaviors do not fully correspond to the expectations o f the 
teacher(-in-training).
The importance o f explicitly mentioning and arguing the teaching abilities for developing 
the cognitive structure o f teaching abilities can be illustrated by the behavior o f the cat in 
Thorndike's cage (1898). W hen the cat touches the handle by accident, it can reach the food. 
At the next trial it will sooner touch the handle. So the cat gradually learns to touch the handle 
in order to get to the food. However, if  the cat is aware o f the way to reach the food, one trial 
suffices. The transfer from one trial to the next one would be one hundred percent. That is to 
say, awareness o f behavior has a strong influence on the availability of this behavior in a new 
relevant situation.
Like the behavior o f Thorndike's cat, the intuitive reaction to an unexpected interactive 
teaching learning situation evaporates, when one does not 'catch' it as a teaching ability. Only 
verification o f the intuitive reaction causes it to be absorbed in the cognitive structure of 
teaching abilities, especially if  this verification aims at developing the cognitive structure of 
teaching abilities. This increases the availability o f teaching abilities in new (pre-active and 
interactive) teaching learning situations (Bol'sunov, M olcanov & Trofimov,1984; De 
Corte,1981,p.65-66; Elshout,1981,p.12).
Summarizing, the explicit mention and discussion o f teaching abilities in pre-active 
teaching and the verification o f intuitive behavior in interactive teaching contributes to the 
development of a cognitive structure o f teaching abilities. The more hierarchically integrated 
the cognitive structure, the greater the availability o f teaching abilities in teaching, which is 
especially important in unexpected interactive teaching learning situations.
Conclusion and Discussion
The question: 'what is the contribution o f intuitive teacher thinking to the growth in 
teaching abailities?', has now been answered by pointing to intuitive thinking in an 
unexpected teaching learning situation which requires immediate response; and to the 
verification o f this intuitive response by way o f logical thinking.
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As far as I know, only few, if  any, research reports have been published about the necessity 
o f intuitive behavior o f teachers, about the frequency o f intuitive behavior o f teachers in 
different circumstances, or about the relation between intuitive behavior and teaching 
effectiveness. In the present article I have tried to convince the reader o f the essential 
contribution o f intuitive behavior to the growth in the cognitive structure o f teaching abilities, 
in other words, in teaching effectiveness.
However, the importance o f intuitive behavior can be emphasized by referring to research 
on human behavior in other areas. For instance, in management and innovation, the essential 
role o f intuitive, creative, dynamic behavior is stressed (Rowan, 1986; Van den Berg, 1992). 
Moreover, the extended empirical research from the fifties to the seventies on creativity; on 
the relation between creativity and intelligence; on the construction o f training programs; and 
on the evaluation o f these programs, resulted in a body o f knowledge which can be used as a 
legitimation and inspiration for conducting research in the area o f intuitive behavior of 
teachers. Finally, it will be useful if  this research on creativity is interpreted in terms o f the 
above-mentioned intuition-based model o f ideational fluency and in terms o f the criticism of 
Artificial Intelligence (Graham, 1993; Still & Costall, 1991).
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